By Anna Perez-Catala (IDDRI), Hanne Knaepen (ECDPM), Mariana Camelo (ETTG), Marta Torres Gunfaus (IDDRI), Steffen Bauer (IDOS), Niels Keijzer (IDOS)
This blog draws on discussions at a closed-door roundtable titled “EU Climate Diplomacy: Promoting EU and Global Climate Goals in the Evolving Climate Regime,” held in Brussels on 3 September 2026 and co-organised by ETTG, IDDRI and IDOS (more on the event here). The session convened senior officials from DG CLIMA, EU member states and experts. Views expressed reflect the range of positions raised in the discussion and are not attributed to individual participants or institutions; they do not necessarily represent the position of ETTG or its member institutes.
In her 2026 “State of the Union” (SOTEU) address, European Commission President von der Leyen declared that Europe “can, must and will stay the course” on its climate targets. The President’s renewed sense of urgency is made in the context of complex geopolitical shifts, mounting climate impacts, the largest energy crisis ever seen, but also a transformation towards decarbonised economies that is accelerating, highlighting the need for climate cooperation.
Last year, COP30 in Belém had closed with the Brazilian presidency proposing a structural change to how the climate regime itself operates: a shift toward “two-tier multilateralism”, separating the consensus-based negotiating track from a looser, coalition-driven implementation track. The discussions at the ETTG event sat squarely between these two moments, and its central questions were blunt: how, concretely, can the EU make international climate cooperation work more effectively in the current geopolitical context, particularly by shifting focus from negotiations towards implementation?
A regime built for negotiation, now expected to deliver implementation
Since the Paris Agreement‘s rulebook is essentially complete, international climate action now depends to a large extent on countries’ ability to implement all that has been agreed – both in terms of domestic action and mobilisation of actors-, as well as aligning international cooperation and means for implementation. COP31, to be held in Antalya under a dual Türkiye-Australia presidency arrangement, is not expected to produce a major new negotiated outcome. Within the formal process, attention has shifted to the core elements of the Agreement: nationally determined contributions (NDCs), Biennial Transparency Reports, and the second Global Stocktake (GST2), mechanisms through which the world checks whether global action is on track and how individual countries are contributing. During the ETTG roundtable, several participants highlighted the important role of the UNFCCC in providing transparency, accountability and political signals, while also recognising the limits of what the multilateral process can deliver in terms of implementation. Questions were raised about how to strengthen its effectiveness in a context of growing political and financial constraints.
Others argued that the problem lies less with the UNFCCC itself than with countries’ willingness to act on their commitments. The EU’s frustration with COP outcomes also reflects expectations shaped by a more optimistic era of multilateralism. While significant ambition and implementation gaps remain, most countries are submitting NDCs and increasingly developing adaptation plans, showing that the system continues to function, even if progress remains insufficient.
Several participants observed that “climate diplomacy” is increasingly about “energy diplomacy” and “economic diplomacy” This creates opportunities for the EU to strengthen implementation-focused partnerships, including with countries such as China and Brazil, particularly around electrification, clean energy infrastructure and carbon markets. Such cooperation could also help build momentum within the multilateral climate process.
Signal value and implementation value
The Brazilian presidency’s two-tier approach distinguishes between consensus-based negotiations that provide legitimacy and direction, and more flexible, coalition-driven initiatives focused on implementation. As participants noted, this shift is already taking place. Existing initiatives, such as the Global Climate Action Agenda, alongside newer efforts including the Global Implementation Accelerator and Belém Mission 1.5°C, both mandated at COP30 and carried forward jointly by the Brazilian and incoming Turkish–Australian presidencies, illustrate how implementation is increasingly being pursued beyond formal negotiations.
Participants also reflected on the continued role of the UNFCCC in providing political signals, promoting accountability and ensuring that equity and solidarity remain central to international climate cooperation. While some emphasised the importance of shifting attention from new commitments towards implementation, others stressed that the multilateral process remains essential for giving smaller and climate-vulnerable countries a voice on, for instance, the climate adaptation agenda. A stronger focus on plurilateral initiatives should therefore complement, rather than undermine, these functions.
Locating the EU’s implementation levers
The second half of the roundtable moved from architecture to instruments. Three areas stood out: trade and market instruments, carbon markets, and electrification.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism was repeatedly cited as the EU’s most tangible climate diplomatic-economic tool credited with encouraging the emergence of emissions trading systems in partner countries, while being widely contested. The EU will need to use diplomacy and economic partnerships to build political support for its climate policies, explaining how it aligns with broader collective Paris Agreement goals. Discussions point out the large set of economic and trade measures that can be deployed for specific sectors, products or value chains, with repeated references to the needs and opportunities in the steel sector.
Carbon markets and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement offer another avenue for international cooperation, although participants expressed differing views on their potential to deliver meaningful emissions reductions. Emerging initiatives, including cooperation between the EU, Brazil and China on carbon markets, illustrate opportunities for collaboration despite wider geopolitical tensions.
Finally, electrification and clean energy infrastructure emerged as particularly promising areas for implementation-focused cooperation. The EU is investing in grid integration and offshore wind connections to North Africa, the Balkans and Türkiye. Technical cooperation and sharing lessons is attracting interest from China, India and, potentially, even the United States (albeit on narrowly technical grounds). These areas demonstrate how the EU’s domestic energy transition, industrial interests and international climate diplomacy are becoming increasingly interconnected.
Making better use of these instruments will also require stronger coordination within the EU. As climate diplomacy becomes increasingly intertwined with trade, industrial and energy policy, effective implementation depends on cooperation across different parts of the European Commission and with Member States. Overcoming these institutional silos will be important if the EU is to translate its broader climate and energy diplomacy ambitions into concrete action.
What to watch towards Antalya
Looking ahead to COP31 in Antalya, five priorities stand out for EU climate diplomacy:
- Preparing for a solid, second Global Stocktake (GST2). The first Global Stocktake benefited from a rare political alignment and produced the widely cited “transition away from fossil fuels” language. Participants considered that those conditions, and an IPCC process operating with full political confidence, will not recur. Securing the necessary preparatory work and managing expectations around GST2 without diminishing its function as the regime’s central accountability and signaling moment is likely to be a genuine test.
- Strengthening cooperation with China. Nearly every substantive point in the discussion- carbon markets, electrification, methane, resilient finance- eventually returned to the EU-China relationship. The question is whether the EU and China can turn their shared interests into a shared agenda (notably in the absence of the US).
- Building political support for specific actions to progress on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels, including strategic diplomacy to encourage countries to prepare National TAFF Roadmaps, regular Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS) or equivalent planning documents. Participants echoed the window of opportunity this year against the backdrop of the Hormuz crisis and dramatic climate impacts.
- Keeping adaptation and resilience high on the agenda. With outstanding issues around the Global Goal on Adaptation and the Adaptation Fund, COP31 will need to deliver meaningful progress on adaptation. For the EU, this also means ensuring that the growing emphasis on implementation and strategic partnerships does not come at the expense of international solidarity and support for climate-vulnerable countries.
- Making the Action Agenda deliver. There was broad agreement that the Global Climate Action Agenda matters more now than in previous cycles, and equally broad uncertainty about which initiatives should be prioritised, who should own that curation, and how actionable follow-up should be tracked, and success measured beyond fancy headline pledges that, all too often, remain of little consequence.
Ultimately, the challenge for the EU is not to choose between multilateralism and more flexible forms of cooperation, but to make them mutually reinforcing. COP31 will be an important opportunity to demonstrate how implementation-focused partnerships can strengthen, rather than weaken, the multilateral climate regime.
